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Abstract 32 
This study determines the magnitude of the market signaling effect arising from 33 
LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) certification for green buildings 34 
and explores the mechanisms behind the signaling effect. Previous studies have shown 35 
that signaling or marketability plays an important role in the pursuit for LEED and 36 
equivalent green-building certification. By analyzing all new construction projects 37 
receiving LEED certification from 2000 to 2012 in the US, this study estimates the 38 
relative importance of ‘green’ signaling. This broad perspective using project-level data 39 
enables an analysis of some drivers of signaling and the pursuit of marketing benefits. 40 
The roles of local competition and market conditions as well as municipal regulations are 41 
examined, especially as they differ between types of building owners (e.g., for-profit 42 
firms, governments, nonprofits). The results indicate that the non-building performance 43 
value – value captured by LEED signals above and beyond the specific building 44 
attributes that LEED certifies – dominates the attainment of LEED scores around 45 
certification tier thresholds. Further, strong evidence of spatial clustering of this 46 
non-building performance value for some owner types indicates that for-profit owners 47 
may be more responsive to local competition than non-profit owners. Local legislative 48 
mandates predict greater signaling intensity by government-owned buildings, as expected, 49 
but for-profit-owned projects tend to signal less, even after controls for local conditions. 50 
The results highlight the importance of local conditions, including peer effects and 51 
regulations, in driving non-building performance values across a wide range of green 52 
buildings.  53 
 54 
Keywords:  55 
LEED, signaling, non-building performance value, spatial clustering, local regulation 56 
 57 
Introduction 58 
To an extent, all LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) 59 
participants are signalers. Instead of “going green” quietly, LEED participants choose to 60 
pay to be certified, so that they can gain additional advantages other than energy savings. 61 
These additional advantages include enhancing marketing as a greener product or firm, a 62 
premium on rents and property values, fulfilling legal obligations, and showing social 63 
responsibility.  64 
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Moreover, due to the design of the four-tier certification system, participants in the 65 
LEED certification program signal among themselves. A scorecard is used to determine 66 
the performance of LEED participants. Higher scores mean better or “greener” 67 
performance of buildings. Based on the score participants earned, LEED issues four 68 
different tiers of certificate: certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum. Without any 69 
LEED-related signaling, each participant would attain a hypothetical ‘optimal’ score, 70 
when the marginal cost of reaching that score equals the marginal gains of performance 71 
enhancement. This is the counterfactual. However, the signaling effect induces some 72 
participants to pursue a higher score, especially when their optimal scores are just a few 73 
points shy of the next higher certificate tier. This allows participants to show that they 74 
surpass other participants, especially their competitors. This “signaling effect among 75 
signalers” is the main focus of this study. For simplicity purposes, the signaling effect in 76 
this study is defined as the effect that drives LEED participants to the next higher 77 
certificate tier than they would otherwise attain. We refer to this aspect of the signal, 78 
which is associated with the discontinuous jump to a higher LEED certification tier rather 79 
than the raw LEED score’s continuous measure of the building’s performance, as a 80 
“non-building performance signal” or a “signaling effect” for short. Of course getting 81 
LEED certified at a particular score sends a market signal about building performance 82 
quality as well, but the interest of this study is on the non-building performance aspects 83 
(discussed further below). 84 
This study aims to identify the signaling effect of LEED certification and the 85 
mechanisms behind the effect. The first part of this study quantifies the size of the 86 
signaling effect of LEED certification. The methodology used to identify the size of the 87 
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signaling effect is mainly from the method used in Matisoff et al. (2014). The result of 88 
this study confirms that the signaling effect exists in LEED certification, and the size of 89 
signaling effect differs by building owner type.  90 
Further, this study examines mechanisms behind the signaling effect for each owner 91 
type from a broad perspective by analyzing the complete set of LEED-NC-certified 92 
projects (v2.0-v2.2) across the country from 2000-2012. A first step in analyzing the 93 
distribution of LEED projects as a whole is to assess peer effects (Qiu, Yin, & Wang, 94 
2016). Whether geographically close projects influence each other’s signaling effects can 95 
be evaluated with the global Moran’s I, which is commonly used in identifying the spatial 96 
clustering. Based on the result of the global Moran’s I, government-owned buildings and 97 
buildings owned by for-profit firms spatially cluster more than buildings owned by 98 
non-profit organizations. To further identify the sources of the signaling effect, a 99 
regression is conducted to verify the relationship between the signaling effect and 100 
municipal legislative mandates, where there is considerable local variation in policy. The 101 
results show that municipal regulations for constructing green buildings, which tend to 102 
apply to just new buildings, induce government agencies to signal more. This effect of 103 
regulation, however, is not evident for for-profit firms and nonprofit organizations. Also, 104 
the results indicates that local competition is unlikely to be the main mechanisms behind 105 
the signaling for for-profit firms.  106 
This study has several potential applications. First, the signaling effect measured in 107 
this study can be viewed as a comprehensive consequence of non-building performance 108 
values in the pursuit of LEED certificate. While the appeal and function of LEED’s 109 
performance values are relatively straightforward and easily understood, comprehending 110 
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how non-building performance value affects the behavior of owners helps to better 111 
illustrate the whole picture of the pursuit of green signaling in buildings. Second, the 112 
empirical results of this study help clarify the sources of the signaling effect or 113 
non-building performance value for different types of building owners. Identifying the 114 
sources of the non-building performance value can help inform the design of policies to 115 
make buildings greener. For example, evidence of spatial clustering in this upgrading or 116 
signaling behavior supports raising LEED thresholds to use the contagious signaling to 117 
catalyze even higher performing buildings. If signaling spreads locally, then initially 118 
subsidizing new green buildings can spur a “race to the top.” Further, results indicating 119 
the relative importance of the signaling effect can help policymakers target strategies to 120 
appeal to different adoption motivations across owner types.  121 
 122 
Literature Review 123 
LEED, or any other green-building certification system, can possibly benefit 124 
building owners through channels other than building performance-based benefits or 125 
lower lifecycle costs (Matisoff, Noonan, & Flowers, 2016; Matisoff et al., 2014). The 126 
building performance benefits can be viewed as energy savings and other internally 127 
beneficial environmental gains (e.g., cleaner indoor air, water efficiency) after adoption 128 
(Kats, 2003; Singh, Syal, Grady, & Korkmaz, 2010; Turban & Greening., 1997). Many 129 
environmental benefits from green buildings, however, are public goods and thus not 130 
capitalizable or directly influencing return of investment. Thus, some buildings may not 131 
get a positive return of investment in pursuing green-building certificates (D'Antonio, 132 
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2007; Mapp, Nobe, & Dunbar, 2011; Mills et al., 2004; Newsham, Mancini, & Birt, 2009; 133 
Turner & Frankel, 2008). Benefits other than direct building performance benefits are 134 
considered as “non-building performance” benefits in this study. Since many of the 135 
benefits of adoption are external while all the costs are internal, it implies that there may 136 
be other reasons for the pursuit of LEED. 137 
Non-building performance benefits from adopting LEED could come from several 138 
sources. The benefits are expected to vary by owner type. For government buildings, the 139 
most obvious reason is legislative obligations. At the state level, twenty U.S. states have 140 
adopted green-building related mandates (Green Building Pages, 2015), and most LEED 141 
or LEED-equivalent mandates only apply to government buildings (Matisoff et al., 2016). 142 
According to survey data collected by Feiock et al. (2014), 350 out of 2,003 cities (17 143 
percent) in the dataset require a certain level of energy efficiency standards to be met for 144 
the new construction of municipal buildings (Feiock, Krause, Hawkins, & Curley, 2014). 145 
Currently, legislative mandates are usually limited to public-sector buildings (Lewyn, 146 
2014). Using matching methods and instrumental variables, Simcoe and Toffel (2014) 147 
indicate that these municipal regulations on governmental buildings produce spillover 148 
effects that stimulate private-sector adoption of the LEED certification. Building on their 149 
work, this analysis informs whether and how these local regulations also stimulate pursuit 150 
of non-building performance benefits. 151 
For private-sector buildings, previous literature lists many market benefits of green 152 
building and certification. For example, certified green buildings benefit from the 153 
increase in property value for commercial and residential properties (e.g., Deng & Wu, 154 
2014; Fuerst & McAllister, 2011b; Shewmake & Viscusi, 2015), including a premium on 155 
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sales prices or rental rates, and occupancy rates (Eichholtz, Kok, & Quigley, 2010; Fuerst 156 
& McAllister, 2011a). The sources of this premium could be reduced utility costs, 157 
improved productivity (e.g., lower staff turnover, absenteeism), and reputation benefits 158 
(Chegut, Eichholtz, & Kok, 2014; Fuerst & McAllister, 2011b; Pivo & Fisher, 2010). 159 
Many of these benefits are likely to geographically cluster, consistent with previous 160 
research showing the spatial clustering of LEED buildings (Kahn & Vaughn, 2009; Kok, 161 
McGraw, & Quigley, 2011).  162 
The important market benefits for private-sector buildings arising through enhanced 163 
branding or reputation (Steel, Pierce, Warner, & Lovrich, 2014) often fall under the 164 
banner of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR can allow firms to charge 165 
premium prices, or to attract better employees and investors (Eichholtz et al., 2010; 166 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Turban & Greening., 1997). Many owners and managers 167 
invest in greener buildings for strategic, CRS-related reasons (Gliedt & Hoicka, 2015). 168 
Since CSR is difficult to identify, it is not surprising that there is not much positive 169 
empirical evidence on the relationship between CSR and profitability (Aupperle, Carroll, 170 
& Hatfield, 1985; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). In theory, however, CSR does provide 171 
many benefits to a firm (Amacher, Koskela, & Ollikainen, 2004; Lyon & Maxwell, 172 
2008). These nonfinancial, strategic considerations can influence energy efficiency 173 
investments (Cooremans, 2011), including marketing benefits and sending green signals 174 
to niche consumers (Fuerst, Oikarinen, & Harjunen, 2016). 175 
Since the source of non-building performance benefits differs by owner type, the 176 
magnitude of non-building performance benefits is also expected to be different. For 177 
government agencies and non-profit organizations, non-building performance benefits 178 
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may play a more important role than for profit-maximizing firms, because their missions 179 
may include “the right thing to do” (Wood, 1991), and because they are less constrained 180 
by profit-maximizing exigencies and competitive forces (Eichholtz, Kok, & Quigley, 181 
2009). Based on the theory of the firm in microeconomics, Matisoff et al. (2014) 182 
theoretically show the output-maximizing organizations (like some government agencies 183 
and nonprofits) face similar incentives to invest in green signaling as profit-maximizing 184 
firms do, and they empirically find that non-profit organizations tend to signal 185 
non-building performance more. If improving a building’s environmental performance 186 
can be expressed as achieving higher scores in LEED certification, this argument leads to 187 
the hypothesis that the LEED achievement for government agencies and non-profit 188 
organizations is more affected by the non-building performance value than for-profit 189 
firms are. 190 
 191 
Data 192 
Since spatial distribution is critical to this study, the study area is limited to the 193 
contiguous United States. The data used in this study comes from two sources. The data 194 
on LEED certification is publicly available on the USGBC website. The dataset includes 195 
scores achieved and certificate tier, as well as characteristics for each building, such as 196 
project name, address, version of LEED, date of certification, owner type, project type, 197 
and building size. The USGBC data divide owner type into several categories: federal 198 
government, state government, local government, for-profit organization, non-profit 199 
organization (e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Alliance to Save Energy), individual, 200 
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and others. For simplicity, this study divides the data into three types of owners: 201 
government agencies (including federal/state/local government), non-profit organizations, 202 
and for-profit firms. Individual owners and other owner types, which contribute less than 203 
10 percent of the data as a whole, are not included in this study for simplicity purposes. 204 
In order to keep the scoring system consistent and comparable, this study only 205 
includes 4,472 buildings that are in the U.S. and are with LEED New Construction 206 
(LEED NC) version 2.0 to 2.2. In this scoring system, a score of 26 to 32 earns a 207 
certificate, a score of 33 to 38 earns a Silver certificate, a score of 39 to 51 earns a Gold 208 
certificate, and a score over 52 earns a Platinum certificate. Figure 1 shows the 209 
frequencies for each score at the national level. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of 210 
the 4,472 LEED buildings included in this study. 211 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  212 
 213 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 214 
 215 
 216 
As shown in Figure 1, the skewed, “upside-down sawtooth” distribution clearly 217 
indicates some interesting patterns in the data at the macro level, implying the existence 218 
of signaling effect. Of course, project-specific factors facing building owners affect 219 
where that observation falls in the observed distribution. Yet, broadly speaking, some 220 
discontinuous benefits with each tier attracts bunching just above thresholds (Shewmake 221 
& Viscusi, 2015). Owners tend to recognize the potential benefits of upgrading to the 222 
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next highest certificate level, and thus choose to pay additional costs to move up a tier 223 
rather than stay just below the threshold. The high density at scores just above thresholds 224 
implies that building owners tend to either earn a couple more credits to upgrade to the 225 
next certificate tier, or stop making improvements since a couple more credits will not 226 
bring them to the next highest tier. Note that the potential benefits for achieving the next 227 
highest certificate tier are not for certain. Building owners have to evaluate their own 228 
risks and make the choice. The fact that not every just-below-threshold building chooses 229 
to go for the next level and take the additional benefits implies the existence of upgrading 230 
costs and risks. Of course, the LEED context is very complicated at the micro level, 231 
where cost-benefit analysis and simple return on investment is highly contextual. This 232 
study analyzes the green building data at a more systemic, macro perspective. Future 233 
work, including case studies, could investigate these micro-level factors in more detail. 234 
The high frequency of scores above threshold scores indicates that building owners 235 
sometimes overshoot when they aim for threshold scores. For a building that is only one 236 
credit shy of the next higher certificate tier, the best improvement available might worth 237 
at most, say, three points. The building thus might end up with two points higher than the 238 
threshold, and the driving force of moving to its current score is mainly signaling from 239 
the next tier. Thus, scores that are one or two points just above thresholds should also be 240 
included in the identification of the amount of signaling associated with upgrading to the 241 
next LEED tier. 242 
    To further clarify the effect of municipal regulations on the signaling of LEED 243 
certification, the regulation data from the Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD) 244 
is used in this study (https://localgov.fsu.edu/ICSD/). ICSD is a comprehensive dataset of 245 
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U.S. municipal government sustainability programs and policies (Feiock et al., 2014). 246 
The variable used here is a dummy variable from the survey question “Does your city 247 
require all new government construction projects to be LEED or Energy Star certified?” 248 
Surveys related to this variable are conducted between 2010 and 2011. The response rate 249 
is over 70%, which is relatively high. Altogether, 350 out of 2,003 respondent cities 250 
reported these requirements at the time of survey. The variable reflects whether the 251 
policies are in the place at that time. 252 
 253 
Methodology  254 
This study quantifies the signaling effect in the pursuit of LEED certification by 255 
utilizing a kernel density function, which generates smooth conditional expectations 256 
based on input-distributions (Silverman, 1981). The identification of the signaling effect 257 
can be summarized into four steps. First, a histogram of scores achieved at the national 258 
level is generated for each owner type. Second, all the densities that are around 259 
thresholds, both below and above, where the signaling effect mainly occurs, are dropped 260 
from the histogram. Third, the kernel density estimation is performed to generate a new 261 
distribution based on the histogram for remaining observations. And finally, the original, 262 
observed densities are compared to the new distribution, where densities that are dropped 263 
in the second step are replaced by kernel estimates from the third step. The theoretical 264 
background and more details about this process can be found in Matisoff et al. (2014) and 265 
in a very similar model by Shewmake & Viscusi (2015). The advantage of this process is 266 
that, by removing densities that are affected by the signaling effect, the observations left 267 
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reflect the distribution as if there were no signaling effect. After recovering the missing 268 
densities with the kernel density function, the new distribution can be viewed as the 269 
counterfactual distribution based on pure building performance value (not influenced by 270 
the disturbances around the thresholds). Thus, by comparing the original and the 271 
counterfactual densities, the Signaling factor for each threshold score i can thus be 272 
defined as: 273 
(𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑖 =
(𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖 − (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖
(𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖
 274 
The signaling factor represents the estimated proportion of observations that exceeds 275 
what we would otherwise expect in the absence of threshold effects for each score 276 
because of the discontinuous value of LEED certification at the thresholds. Assuming 277 
that environmental quality or building performance rises continuously in LEED scores, 278 
this approach quantifies the discontinuous jump associated with the “signaling value” (or 279 
non-building performance value). In other words, it can be viewed as a quantitative 280 
measure of signaling effect for each score (for certain owner types).1  281 
The identification of this signaling effect is sensitive to the designation of how wide 282 
of a neighborhood of scores around the each threshold will be dropped. Dropping fewer 283 
scores keeps more information for the generation of kernel density, but the counterfactual 284 
density may be influenced by projects that over-shot thresholds. Thus, the measured 285 
signaling effect is likely to be underestimated. Dropping more scores captures more of 286 
                                                 
1 This assumption relies on the design of the LEED NC certification scheme, where thresholds are based 
on proportions of the base points available and that attained scores rely on a bundle of attributes that all 
positively contribute to environmental performance. This allows the construction of a signaling factor, 
which applies on average or in aggregate, although it cannot calculate signaling for a particular building 
(i.e., on a case-by-case basis). 
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the signaling effect, but leaves less information for the generation of kernel density, 287 
possibly biasing the estimates. This study drops three scores for each tier (i.e., the 288 
threshold score, one above, and one below) as the default. Dropping one score (the 289 
threshold only) and five scores (the threshold, two above and two below) are reported as 290 
sensitivity checks. 291 
After identifying the intensity of signaling for each LEED score, the second stage of 292 
the study then turns to identify the mechanism behind the signaling effect. A regression 293 
model that explains the relationship between the signaling effect and municipal 294 
regulations2, and the global Moran’s I that identifies the spatial dependence of the 295 
signaling effect, are estimated for this purpose. For the regression model, it can be written 296 
as: 297 
  𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝛼 + (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝛽1 + (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)𝛽2 + (𝑅𝑒𝑔 × 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)𝛽2 +298 
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠)𝛽3 + (𝑁𝑢𝑚 × 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)𝛽4 + 𝜀 299 
where the Signaling factor denotes the corresponding signaling factor for each 300 
observation (i.e., LEED building project) according to the owner type classification and 301 
the scores achieved. Regulation is a dummy variable that takes on the value of unity if the 302 
observation is located in a city with municipal standards. Owner type denotes the dummy 303 
variable for each owner type. 𝑅𝑒𝑔 × 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 refers to the interaction terms between 304 
Regulation and Owner type. Number counts denotes the total number of LEED buildings 305 
in the municipal jurisdiction of the observation, and 𝑁𝑢𝑚 × 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 refers to the 306 
interaction terms between Number counts and Owner type. Note that only positive 307 
                                                 
2 Regulations are limited to municipal regulations for two reasons. First, the cross-sectional model would 
have no variation in national-level regulations. Second, local regulations are where there is the most 
variation in policies (Matisoff et al., 2016). 
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signaling factors (i.e., when the original densities are larger than the counterfactual ones) 308 
are assigned in this process. Signaling factors with negative signs are coded as zeros to 309 
avoid exaggerating (i.e., double counting) the signaling effect of thresholds.  310 
The global Moran’s I is used to measure the spatial correlation of signaling effect in 311 
this study. The first step is to assign signaling factors to each LEED-certified building 312 
based on owner type. Again, only positive signaling factors are assigned in this process. 313 
The global Moran’s Index (Moran’s I), which is an index to reflect the level of spatial 314 
correlation (Moran, 1950), is then calculated to identify the spatial dependence of 315 
signaling factors. Moran’s I is defined as: 316 
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑛′𝑠 𝐼 =
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗(𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝑋𝑗 − ?̅?)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 317 
Where 𝑛 is the number of spatial units, 𝜔𝑖𝑗 denotes the element of spatial weights 318 
between observations i and j, X is the variable of interest (the signaling factor in this case) 319 
and ?̅? is the mean of X. Spatial weight 𝜔 reflects how “neighbors” are defined. For 320 
example, it can be a dummy variable showing whether two units are directly contiguous, 321 
or it can be the inverse distance/squared inverse distance between observations, reflecting 322 
the gradient of influence by distance. In this study, the method of inverse distance is used 323 
to calculate the global Moran’s I. Contiguity is not applicable here because nearly no 324 
LEED buildings are adjacent to each other. In normal cases, Moran’s I ranges from -1 to 325 
1, where -1 represents the case of perfectly dispersed, 1 illustrates perfectly clustered, and 326 
zero means purely random. But in some extreme cases, such as when the variable X is 327 
strongly skewed or when 𝜔𝑖𝑗 is extremely small, Moran’s I can exceed the bound of -1 328 
and 1. 329 
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Result and Discussion 330 
1. Identifying Signaling Factors 331 
The first part of this study identifies the signaling factor for each score by owner 332 
type. As mentioned in the Method section, the signaling factor reflects the weight of 333 
non-building performance value in the decision process. Table 1 summarizes the 334 
calculated Signaling factor by owner type. For each owner type, three scenarios of 335 
generating signaling factors are used: (1) only the threshold score of each certificate tier 336 
(scores of 26, 33, 39, and 52) are replaced by kernel estimates; (2) three scores (the 337 
threshold score, one above and one below) are replaced for each certificate tier; and (3) 338 
five scores (the threshold, two above and two below) are replaced. The dotted lines 339 
denote the threshold for each certificate tier.  340 
 341 
Table 1 Signaling Factors by Score and by Owner Type, for Various Scenarios 342 
 
  Governments   Non-profits   For-profits 
Score\Scenario   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
24 
   
- 
   
- 
   
- 
25 
  
- - 
  
- - 
  
- - 
26   0.62  0.79  0.90    0.59  0.72  0.80    0.52  0.64  0.66  
27 
  
0.32  0.44  
  
0.48  0.57  
  
0.27  0.33  
28     -0.03      0.18      0.23  
31 
   
-0.61  
   
-0.39  
   
-0.92  
32 
  
-0.57  -0.68  
  
-0.87  -0.52  
  
-1.26  -1.60  
33   0.48  0.72  0.88    0.51  0.67  0.78    0.52  0.57  0.60  
34 
  
0.46  0.69  
  
0.56  0.75  
  
0.11  0.42  
35     0.48      0.54      0.60  
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37 
   
-0.33  
   
-0.30  
   
-0.10  
38 
  
-1.36  -1.34  
  
-3.49  -1.78  
  
-8.76  -6.36  
39   0.56  0.77  0.84    0.53  0.64  0.71    0.48  0.60  0.58  
40 
  
0.51  0.59  
  
0.48  0.54  
  
0.59  0.56  
41     -0.11      0.02      0.14  
50 
   
-0.72  
   
- 
   
- 
51 
  
- - 
  
- - 
  
- - 
52   0.60  0.81  0.88    0.50  0.65  0.69    0.63  0.79  0.75  
53 
  
0.52  0.55  
  
0.56  0.60  
  
0.65  0.67  
54     -0.26      0.01      0.25  
% of subsample   45.6    22.7    31.7  
Note: the signaling factor is marked as ‘-‘ if the original density at that score is 0. 343 
 344 
    The interpretation of Table 1 focuses on the second scenario (shaded columns) that 345 
replaces three scores for each threshold. Comparing Scenario (1) and (2), it is clear that 346 
the signaling effect is stronger in Scenario (2) for all owner types. Given the fact that 347 
building owners sometimes overshoot when aiming for the threshold, it is expected that 348 
replacing more scores around the thresholds captures more signaling effect. Thus, 349 
Scenario (2) is preferred to Scenario (1). In comparing Scenario (2) and (3), Scenario (2) 350 
is preferred for mainly two reasons. First, the negative signs for scores above thresholds 351 
(e.g., 28, 41) are signs of over-estimation. By definition, a negative signaling factor 352 
means that the actual density at which score is smaller than the counterfactual kernel 353 
estimate. Negative signaling factors are expected for scores just below thresholds, 354 
because it provides evidence that non-building performance value often makes those 355 
just-below scores less preferable. But this theoretical explanation does not necessarily 356 
apply to scores just-above thresholds. No theory suggests that building owners would 357 
rather achieve a lower score than they otherwise would have, because of non-building 358 
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performance value. Thus, these negatives on the right-hand side of the thresholds are 359 
viewed as a result of replacing too many scores’ densities by kernel estimates. In addition, 360 
the magnitude of signaling factors in Scenario (3) is not significantly larger than that in 361 
Scenario (2). Therefore, Scenario (2) is preferred to Scenario (1) and (3). Still, the result 362 
for Scenario (1) and (3) is reported as sensitivity checks. 363 
The negative signaling factors in Table 1 indicate that building owners tend to avoid 364 
achieving scores that are just below the thresholds. An alternative definition of signaling 365 
factors, which avoids negative values, replaces the denominator with the kernel estimates. 366 
The result for the alternative definition follows the same pattern displayed in Table 1. 367 
The interpretation of the regression results for these two definitions is identical, too. This 368 
study keeps the current definition for a more straightforward interpretation.  369 
    Comparing signaling factors by owner types provides a view of how owner type 370 
affects behaviors. The signaling factors for government agencies are significantly higher 371 
than those for non-profit organizations and for-profit firms. Nearly 80 percent of 372 
government buildings that are right at the thresholds only achieve the thresholds for 373 
non-building performance reasons. One possible source of this strong non-building 374 
performance value is the legislative mandates that require government buildings to go 375 
green (May & Koski, 2007) and attain a certain certification tier. The next section tests 376 
this hypothesis. Agencies that seek to comply at minimal cost will attain just above 377 
thresholds and appear like they are seeking a (non-building performance) signal. When 378 
the government agencies are the only owner type that is required to achieve certain 379 
certificate tier (even if it is not cost-effective), a higher signaling effect for them is 380 
expected.  381 
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Non-profit organizations generally signal more than for-profit firms do, except for 382 
those in the Platinum certificate tier. Under the assumption that for-profit firms care more 383 
about profitability, this result implies that for-profit firms either do not value this 384 
signaling as much as governments/non-profit organizations at lower certificate tiers, or 385 
they do not think the payoff is large enough to overcome the costs and risks. At the 386 
Platinum level, the possible benefit of signaling seems to be high enough for for-profit 387 
firms to be willing to take the risk and signal as much as governments and non-profit 388 
organizations do. Conversely, non-profit owners tend to overshoot the Platinum threshold 389 
more than other owners, driving down their signaling factor and suggesting that these 390 
organizations are trying to maximize environmental performance and marketing signals 391 
are secondary. Non-profits at the top-tier Platinum level may be more like those niche, 392 
green consumers (Fuerst et al., 2016). At the Platinum level, governments and for-profit 393 
firms may not have that priority or luxury and hence bunch at the threshold. Also, this 394 
could be a result of thin data. Only 4.5 percent (64 out of 1,416) of the certified 395 
for-profits choose to pursue for the Platinum, which is much lower than that for 396 
non-profits (9 percent).  397 
 398 
2. The sources of signaling for different owner types 399 
The second part of this study introduces the results in the first part into the inquiry of 400 
the sources of non-building performance value by owner type. The global Moran’s I, and 401 
the regression model of signaling on municipal regulation, is introduced for this purpose. 402 
The global Moran’s I is first used to see whether the signaling factor (i.e., the effect of 403 
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non-building performance value) is spatially clustered. This study assigns the signaling 404 
factor to every LEED-NC building by the owner type and scores achieved. As mentioned 405 
in the Method section, only signaling factors with positive signs are assigned. 406 
(Observations with negative signaling factors are all assigned a value of zero.) The global 407 
Moran’s I of the signaling factor, which reflects the status of spatial dependence, is then 408 
calculated. The results are shown in Table 2.  409 
 410 
 411 
Table 2 Spatial Clustering (global Moran’s I) of Signaling Factors 412 
  Threshold scores All types Governments  Non-profits For-profits 
Signaling factor1 26, 33, 39, 52 0.101 ** 0.090 * 0.282 * 0.285   
Signaling factor2 
26, 27, 33, 34, 39, 40, 
52, 53 
0.288 *** 0.297 *** 0.283 * 0.545 *** 
Signaling factor3 
26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 25, 
39, 40, 41, 52, 53, 54 
0.396 *** 0.380 *** 0.230   0.558 *** 
Signaling dummy1 26, 33, 39, 52 0.082 * 0.066   0.270   0.299 * 
Signaling dummy2 
26, 27, 33, 34, 39, 40, 
52, 53 
0.332 *** 0.342 *** 0.263   0.467 ** 
Signaling dummy3 
26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 25, 
39, 40, 41, 52, 53, 54 
0.337 *** 0.349 *** 0.159   0.424 ** 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 413 
 414 
The first three rows in Table 2 show the global Moran’s I by scenarios of the 415 
signaling factor for each owner type. The following three rows indicate the global 416 
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Moran’s I for “Signaling dummies,” which takes a value of unity for all observations 417 
attaining a score at or just above a threshold. This study focuses on the results of Scenario 418 
2 (shaded rows) and lists the other two scenarios as sensitivity checks. The signaling 419 
factors for all observations show strong evidence of spatial clustering. The result by 420 
owner type shows that the clustering mainly exists for both government agencies and 421 
for-profit firms. For governments, the significant spatial clustering in signaling is evident 422 
across the nation, spanning jurisdictions that require greener government buildings and 423 
those that do not.  424 
The spatial clustering of signaling is significant and strong for for-profit firms. 425 
Furthermore, the spatial correlations in Table 2 refer to the Signaling factor and the 426 
signaling dummy, revealing spatial correlations in non-building performance signals. The 427 
spatial clustering suggests several possible sources of the signaling effect for for-profit 428 
firms. The first possible explanation is localized demand for green buildings. By showing 429 
that the non-building performance reason for pursuing LEED certification clusters more 430 
than LEED buildings per se, the results of this study are consistent with localized demand 431 
for greener buildings. Also, the signaling for for-profit owners might cluster in locally 432 
well-developed LEED markets. It may also reflect a localized supply, expertise, or 433 
clustering in building practices that emphasize non-building performance signaling, 434 
perhaps due to supply-side spillovers from public-sector mandates that have been 435 
previously observed (Simcoe & Toffel, 2014).  436 
Another possible source of the non-building performance value for for-profit firms 437 
is the local competition. Although literature indicates that local governments competing 438 
with each other for the leadership in going green (Sharpe, 1970), it is generally expected 439 
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that the competition among local firms is stronger than that between governments. To 440 
further explore conditions that support local clustering of non-building performance 441 
signals, local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISAs) are calculated per (Anselin, 442 
1995) for for-profit-owned buildings. The local Moran statistic calculated for particular 443 
buildings is a local analog of the global Moran’s I and can be used to identify outliers or 444 
“hot spots.” Correlating local socioeconomic conditions (from the 2000 Census) with 445 
these LISAs can detect if spatial clustering of signaling factors tends to be particularly 446 
pronounced in certain areas. Among cities with four or more LEED projects, for-profit 447 
LEED projects with higher LISAs are located in places with lower populations, higher 448 
education, and higher incomes. The correlations between LISAs and logged population 449 
(ρ=-0.65, p<0.01), logged median household income (ρ=0.39, p<0.01), and the share of 450 
adults with college degrees (ρ=0.30, p<0.04) for those 51 for-profit-owned buildings are 451 
significant and substantial. “Hot spots” of spatially clustered signaling tend to be found in 452 
smaller, wealthier, and more educated places, suggesting important roles for local 453 
markets in influencing non-building performance signaling. 454 
The signaling of non-profit organizations shows far less clustering compared to 455 
other owners. There are three possible reasons for this. First, legal obligation for green 456 
buildings seldom applies to non-profit organizations. Second, they may care less about 457 
cost effectiveness and profit maximizing, so targeting thresholds may be less important 458 
for them. Finally, non-profit organizations may be less likely to compete locally, partly 459 
because of the nature of non-profits and partly because they may be more likely to have a 460 
local monopoly (and not compete with other nearby nonprofits). 461 
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To further identify the sources of non-building performance value for different 462 
owner types, a regression model is introduced to identify the relationship between the 463 
signaling effect and the implementation of municipal regulation. For this purpose, the 464 
signaling factor determined in the first part is assigned to all the observations, according 465 
to the owner type and the score achieved. As mentioned previously, only signaling 466 
factors with positive signs are assigned. (The rest are truncated to a value of zero.) The 467 
results of regressions are summarized in Table 3. The interpretation focuses on the results 468 
for the “Signaling Factor 2” column, which is determined based on the signaling factors 469 
in Scenario (2). The regression results for the signaling factor in Scenarios (1) and (3) are 470 
also listed as a sensitivity check. The result generally follows the same pattern across 471 
scenarios. 472 
Table 3 Regression Results for Signaling Factors 473 
Observation: 4,377 
      
    
Dependent Variable Signaling Factor 2 Signaling Factor 1 Signaling Factor 3 
  (truncated) (truncated) (truncated) 
F-statistic (10, 4366) 5.15 *** 3.47 *** 3.94 *** 
R-squared 0.0113 0.0073 0.0084 
       
Regulation -0.053  ** -0.065  *** -0.058  ** 
Government 0.005  
 
-0.010  
 
0.022  
 
Regulation*Gov 0.092  *** 0.106  *** 0.083  ** 
For-profit firm -0.058  *** -0.015  
 
-0.038  ** 
Regulation*Profit 0.071  ** 0.073  *** 0.059  *
LEED bldg counts 0.004  *** 0.003  ** 0.004  ** 
LEED count*Gov -0.002  ** -0.001  ** -0.002  ** 
LEED count*Profit 0.000  
 
0.000  
 
-0.001  
 
Gov LEED bldg counts -0.004  ** -0.003  * -0.004  *
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Profit LEED bldgs counts -0.005  ** -0.005  ** -0.006  ** 
       
Constant 0.281  *** 0.139  *** 0.362  *** 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 474 
Due to the existence of several interaction terms in the model, linear combinations 475 
of estimators are needed to further identify the effect for each owner type. Several 476 
interesting results of linear combinations of estimators for the Signaling Factor 2 are 477 
listed in Table 4. 478 
Table 4 Result of Linear Combinations of Estimators for Signaling Factor 479 
Dependent Variable: Signaling Factor 2 (truncated) Coefficient 
   Reg + Reg*Gov 0.039  ** 
Reg + Reg*Profit 0.019  
 
LEED_count + LEED count_Gov 0.000  
 
LEED_count + LEED count_Profit -0.001  
 
LEED_count + LEED_count*Gov + LEED count_Gov -0.002  ** 
LEED_count + LEED_count*Gov + LEED count_Profit -0.003  * 
LEED_count + LEED_count*Profit + LEED count_Gov -0.001  
 
LEED_count + LEED_count*Profit + LEED count_Profit -0.001  
 
       *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 480 
Since dummy variables of government agency and for-profit firm are both 481 
introduced into the model, the main coefficients in Table 3 only reflect the effects for 482 
non-profit organizations. The negative sign of Regulation surprisingly indicates that for 483 
non-profit organizations, municipal regulations predict LEED buildings with five 484 
percentage points lower non-building performance signaling factor. Note that the 485 
negative effect here does not mean that non-profit owners score or adopt less with 486 
municipal regulations. It only implies that non-profit owners tend to invest more in 487 
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building performance improvements, rather than marketing or tier-related signaling. One 488 
possible explanation is that the mandates create a richer, more skilled market for LEED 489 
certification. Non-profit owners could then learn from government adopters, thus finding 490 
better return on investment and so a greater emphasis on building or environmental 491 
performance.  492 
Having one additional nonprofit organization with LEED certificate within the same 493 
municipal jurisdiction will increase the average signaling factor for nonprofit buildings 494 
by 0.4 percentage points. In other words, having more nonprofit organizations with 495 
LEED buildings in town makes a nonprofit organization more likely to pursue the next 496 
highest tier (largely due to the signaling reason). Additional LEED buildings for other 497 
owner types do not significantly affect the LEED signaling behavior of nonprofit 498 
organizations in the same metropolitan area. 499 
Linear combinations are needed to appreciate the effects for other owner types. The 500 
results are listed in Table 4. For government agencies, the effect of regulation is 501 
confirmed. Municipal regulations increases government agencies’ signaling factor by 502 
nearly four percentage points. Having an additional government agency with a 503 
LEED-certified building in town decreases the tendency of signaling for government 504 
agencies by 0.2 percentage points, while adding an additional for-profit firm with a 505 
LEED building decreases the tendency of signaling by 0.3 percentage points. 506 
For for-profit firms, the effect of regulation is not significant. The result is as 507 
expected, since municipal regulations typically do not directly apply to for-profit owners. 508 
The effect of adding another for-profit building with LEED in a city is not significant 509 
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either. This result is not consistent with a strong role for local competition, since more 510 
competition does not lead to more signaling. This is a fairly weak test, however, as 511 
marginal for-profit LEED buildings may not compete in the same sector or market as 512 
other LEED buildings in the city. 513 
 514 
3. Study limitations 515 
There are several limitations to this study. First, limited information provided by 516 
USGBC raises concerns about unobserved heterogeneity. Identifying the current 517 
unobserved information of each LEED building, such as the marginal cost of pursuing an 518 
extra credit or to the next highest tier, or many important factors that go into the design of 519 
buildings, would help further understand the behavior of LEED buildings. Current results 520 
in this study are general and unable to identify signaling motivations for specific projects. 521 
Further, unobservables, such as other unmeasured local regulations or plans, are a 522 
concern insofar as they are correlated with both LEED adoption and the measure of 523 
Regulation. Future research should explore other measures of regulations, perhaps 524 
building on the DSIRE datasets. 525 
Second, calculating the spatial dependence with data spanning a decade raises 526 
concern about using a cross-sectional analysis. Being the first analysis of this type, this 527 
study’s cross-sectional approach gives important and novel evidence about geographic 528 
patterns rather than temporal dynamics. Examining only new construction certification 529 
helps focus the analysis on buildings as initially constructed, but it also overlooks other 530 
types of green building certification. Also, this study focuses on building owners rather 531 
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than tenants, who may change over time and who may relate to non-building performance 532 
signals differently than original owners. Further investigation on the impact of tenants is 533 
needed. Of course, more direct measures of motivations for why each project pursued 534 
LEED certification as they did would be illuminating. The approach here has an 535 
advantage of leveraging an objective behavioral measure as the signal itself (i.e., points 536 
earned) rather than relying on survey data or case studies. Nonetheless, additional 537 
research with improved measures of the stakeholders and the “target audience” for LEED 538 
signals would complement this broader perspective.  539 
 540 
Conclusion 541 
Looking at certification behavior of thousands of new LEED buildings over a 542 
decade, the preponderance of buildings achieving scores just above thresholds reflects the 543 
importance of non-building performance benefits generally. The effect of non-building 544 
performance values differs by owner type and by certificate tier. For all tiers except 545 
Platinum, government agencies and non-profit-organizations signal more than for-profit 546 
firms. This result generally confirms the hypothesis that governments and non-profit 547 
organizations rely on green marketing signals as much or more than profit-maximizers, 548 
because their different objectives afford them more opportunities for strategic 549 
investments and less pressure for financial returns and cost effectiveness of building 550 
performance. Once at the Platinum level, however, for-profit firms rarely pursue 551 
additional credits and tend to rely heavily on the signal of the tier itself. Of course, these 552 
general patterns in the data cannot directly account for particular green-building projects’ 553 
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benefits, costs, and risks from pursuing (non-building performance) signaling. A closer 554 
investigation of individual projects’ approach to green signaling is warranted based on 555 
the strong pattern of projects bunching just above thresholds in the LEED tier system, 556 
across various owner types and local regulatory conditions. 557 
Also, by checking the spatial clustering of the signaling factor, and by regressing the 558 
signaling factors on regulations, this analysis tests possible systemic sources of the 559 
non-building performance value in the pursuit of LEED. It is evident that government 560 
regulations are the main source of the non-building performance value for government 561 
agencies. For for-profit firms, the evidence does not point to local regulation or 562 
competition (in terms of more for-profit LEED buildings) as sources of non-building 563 
performance value. Localized demand drivers, such as higher education and incomes, are 564 
positively associated with spatially clustered signaling factors. Although these 565 
socioeconomic factors may not promote more non-building performance signaling 566 
generally, they do play a role in establishing local conditions to support “hot spots” of 567 
green signaling. Further research is required to better understand for-profit builders’ 568 
behavior.  569 
The results of this study have some policy applications. First, the clustering just 570 
above tier thresholds points to opportunities for information-based policies to provide 571 
incentives to build greener beyond what tiered signaling schemes or minimum standards 572 
for compliance provide. Information provision policies, for instance, may help accelerate 573 
peer effects in adopting green building practices. Second, better understanding the 574 
strategies behind the pursuit of LEED helps future regulatory design. The importance of 575 
non-building performance aspects of the signal apparent in LEED certification behavior 576 
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supports “the development of public programs which try to highlight the strategic 577 
character of these investments” rather than the simply financial (Cooremans, 2011, p. 578 
488). For example, taxes and subsidies might not be as effective for non-profit 579 
organizations as for profit firms, because non-profit organizations are not as responsive to 580 
the change of costs at thresholds. Also, the negative effect of Regulation in Table 3 581 
suggests not that mandates for government buildings to be greener do not spillover to the 582 
private sector, but rather that private-sector projects in cities with those mandates tend to 583 
bunch less around thresholds. Insofar as that means a greater emphasis on building 584 
performance, this indicates that spillovers from procurement policies may get adapted by 585 
the private sector to make greener buildings. Finally, the existence of spatial clustering in 586 
signaling would possibly facilitate place-based policies to stimulate green buildings. By 587 
encouraging pilot projects in the region, such as providing technical assistance or 588 
subsidies to encourage new construction to achieve a higher certificate tier, the numbers 589 
of achieving high certificate tiers, as well as adoption of LEED, may grow dramatically 590 
due to the spatial spillover. The analysis here points to these general policy themes as 591 
promising directions, but more research on local policy experimentation is needed to 592 
refine them into more practical recommendations in today’s dynamic green building 593 
landscape. 594 
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